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Critical infrastructures and emerging risks
Part of the problem with understanding the behaviour of infrastructures (e.g., electric power system, transportation system, information and communication systems) is that most of these systems were not designed as integrated systems, but gradually evolved over time. Most infrastructures originate from local networks. Over time, municipal networks evolved. In The Netherlands, for instance, city networks for electric lighting were established in the first decades of the 20th century. Interconnection of city networks and network expansion to rural areas were forged through the intervention of the provincial authorities. Provincial networks thus emerged in the first half of the 20th century. The national grid was not fully established until the second half. Over time, the density of end-user connections increased. Transport functions in the infrastructure were intensified (increasing throughput) to serve a steadily increasing number of users and a steadily increasing demand per user. To improve the security of service, the national grid was interconnected across national borders. At the moment, most national grids in Europe are interconnected. In the course of about one century, the system's dimensions have grown several orders of magnitude.
As illustrated by the case of electricity infrastructure evolution in The Netherlands, infrastructure networks generally do not grow randomly. New nodes added to the existing network are linked to specifically selected nodes. In the natural gas infrastructure, for instance, new urban areas will be connected to existing main pipes. In the World Wide Web, new pages usually link to pages that already have a large number of links to them. The advantage of such a 'preferential' or 'associative' network is that the network becomes very robust against multiple failures of random nodes. The disadvantage is that such a network is extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks. Eliminating just a few of the main hubs in the network may cause the network to become disconnected or to stop functioning at all. From infrastructures, we are dealing today with Critical Infrastructures; this is in fact the story of how building up systems ended up in having risky and vulnerable constructs, highly interdependent and, lately, integrated into systems of continental or world dimensions.
Critical Infrastructures Protection (CIP) is at the crossroads between politics, business, technologies and risks. During the last decade it has been the subject of much rhetoric, but less of effective action. This policy field was initiated by the 1997 report Critical foundations: protecting America's infrastructures, the US President's Commission on CIP, and has been the object of debate, strategies, programmes and plans in the majority of Western countries. It was as if, all at once, every government began recognising the serious dependence of their societies upon a set of infrastructures whose robustness they were neither able to evaluate nor able to assure with their existing capabilities. One point was never fully recognised: behind the term 'Critical' lay the need to cope with a new brand of emerging risks. These risks are international by nature -but the risks management solutions proposed were re-editions of old models. This is still the case of solutions often offered by civil defence, or the emergency management institutions.
Some infrastructures, e.g., energy, water supply and telecommunications are so vital and ubiquitous that their incapacity or destruction would not only affect the security and social welfare of any nation, but also cascade across borders. Not only are they exposed to multiple threats -such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters or institutional changes -but their failure might induce risks to other interconnected systems. There is an urgent need to address such problems with appropriate risk assessment and in-time policy analysis at an international level.
The first question that one may ask is about the changes that make those infrastructures and their possible failures more relevant than years before. First of all, the political perspective on security changed with the end of the Cold War, and a new regard was awarded to the essential services needed for running the civil society. On the other hand, several processes, technological and market related, were mutating the configuration and reach of the infrastructures.
The main factors that have transformed the nature of infrastructures, i.e., how these systems are designed, developed, deployed and operated, are:
• the liberalisation of markets, mainly affecting the electric power and telecommunications fields, because of which previous monopolies had to cede their position and compete with other players • the internetworking among infrastructures that require each other for completing their functioning, generating an intertwined mesh of interdependent systems • the increase in cross-border interconnections, justified by the need to share capacity in case of major malfunctions • the technological changes brought by the evolution of information and communication technologies and their pervasive exploitation for improving the control of systems, the interaction with the industrial and business sides of companies, and the relations among the actors in the supply chains.
It was as if we were caught by surprise by the recognition of the fragility yielded by those changes. Infrastructures have been developing and occupying an ever more important role in society since the industrial revolution in the last part of the 19th century. The evolution of technology has provided during these decades a continuous flow of means, and the reliability of systems was only jeopardised by technical faults or by natural phenomena.
The previously listed transformations opened opportunities to new risks:
• The liberalisation of markets diluted the responsibilities with respect to potential shortcomings. Each operator of an infrastructural system licitly looks to its own business interests. The countermeasures implemented for countering the risks respond to one's own judgement of costs and benefits, in the context of the rules and constraints defined by the authorities. Typically, infrastructural services are recognised as basic public services, and for that reason they are subject to governmental regulation. Nevertheless, risks are still managed piecemeal, without an overall consideration of the compound effectiveness of the single risk management approach.
• The interdependencies among infrastructures mean that the potential origins of system failures might proceed from external systems. The normal way of dealing with risks considers systems with clearly defined interactions with their environment. But the complexity of interdependent infrastructures precludes the comprehensive knowledge of potential threats without a deeper understanding of the connected systems. But the most that can be expected is the definition of service levels among the individual operators of the systems.
• The increase in cross-border interconnections has made each national infrastructure dependent on the proper functioning of the others. Some of these interconnections are part of long and complex international infrastructural corridors (e.g., energy, transport, telecommunications) that need to be considered in their entirety. Most of them will lose much of their functionality and usefulness if disconnected. In addition, this interaction means that each interconnected system is at the same time a provider of services and a potential source of risk problems.
• The great changes in information and communication technologies have extended the channels connecting the systems, but most of them are open public networks. This fact augments the possibility of suffering malicious attacks. Open networks, now reachable worldwide, are as accessible to users with legitimate objectives as to those with negative intents. In this case, more technological development signifies more vulnerability.
Some of these problems were recognised from the very beginning, but it is doubtful that the policies put in place have provided any effective answer. This is partly owing to the many disciplines involved in the problem: legal and market issues, technologies, international relations, national security. There is no simple answer. A first consequence of this situation is that each subject was previously treated in a separate manner: industrial policies for the regulation and development of services and the companies offering them, civil defence and emergency management for dealing with the negative consequences of potential accidents, law enforcement for coping with organised crime, national defence for responding to external threats. In light of the nature and challenges posed by critical infrastructures, a convergence of these topics is required.
However, one question remains open: how to make decisions about the risks in Critical Infrastructures. This is outside the realm of governments, as infrastructures are operated (almost exclusively) by private companies. But the accumulation of the risk management decisions by the single companies will only rarely provide a proper answer to the global risk situation. If the international dimension is added, the need for an apposite answer is indisputable. There is a new trend worldwide in addressing risks of complex systems, and this leads to the concept of risk governance.
Critical electricity infrastructures: the European case
Europe witnessed in the last years a number of significant power contingencies. Some of them revealed a potentially vast impact on the welfare of society and triggered pressing questions on the nature and reliability of electric power systems. Society has incorporated electricity as an inherent component, indispensable for achieving the expected level of quality of life. Therefore, any impingement on the continuity and properties of the electricity service would be able to distress society as a whole, affecting individuals, social and economic activities, other infrastructures (Thissen and Herder, 2003) and essential government functions. It would be possible to hypothesise that in extreme situations this could even upset national security.
The blackouts and near misses that happened in the last few years draw several notable lessons that have to be carefully taken into consideration:
• There are hints of some inadequacy. Heavy workloads and limited reserve generation capacities make systems vulnerable to widespread disruptions. Protection systems have been found to play a key role in the majority of catastrophic failures. Power systems have not been designed to cope with the concurrent outage of two or more critical components.
• Incidents were aggravated by other factors, including the lack of timely comprehension by control-room operators of potentially far-reaching failures and short-term emergency requirements.
• The recent liberalisation of the European electricity market has led to increased cross-border trades, for which power systems were not originally designed.
• European Transmission System Operators (TSOs), which have only limited system monitoring capabilities and limited influence on international power trading, confront more and more unanticipated congestions on the tie-lines.
Europe has developed during the last decade a comprehensive energy supply policy, unbundling the previous monopolies and opening the generation and distribution markets (European Commission, 2003) . This policy has deeply changed the business and regulatory landscape of the electric power infrastructure. From the consumer point of view the effects have been positive: there are more potential suppliers, and prices follow market rules.
The immediate economic effects of the new policy have not been accompanied by changes in the underpinning physical systems, whose evolution demands at least medium-term investments and planning. For the time being, the power infrastructure has showed an appropriate reliability level, but new threats can be foreseen in the horizon. Some of these threats are internal to the infrastructure, mainly due to the increasing complexity of many technical and market elements; some of them are external, for instance the menace terrorism.
Therefore, the security of the evolving European electric power infrastructure deserves cautious and thorough consideration.
1 Electricity is a 'common good', central to the security and welfare of almost a half-billion people and the stability and future economic developments of more than 30 countries. For this reason, although local contingencies can be tolerated up to a given degree, if the power system appeared unreliable at the continental level, it would become a matter of major concern. Europe cannot afford systematic failures of its power infrastructure, which could eventually lead to the weakening of the citizens' trust in societal institutions.
The various national European electricity systems, after the transformation experienced in the last years, now form part of a unique and integrated, so called, European Critical Electricity Infrastructure (ECEI). This situation results from an evolution that has been unfolding for decades, which is determined by two main driving forces: namely, market liberalisation (European Commission, 2004) at the continental scale, and high interconnection among regional systems. This has been made possible by the pervasive incorporation of information and communication technologies.
This infrastructure, a socio-technical artefact, tends to function as a unit, although it embeds several jurisdictions, operators and markets. It derives from the interconnection of national and regional systems, but at the same time it behaves as a single, compound system-of-systems. It is decentralised, but still disturbances can propagate all through it, and risks have to be coped with in a coordinated way. The passage from a set of electricity systems to the ECEI is not just a question of more elements or actors; it represents a qualitative leap. ECEI, an infrastructural system-of-systems, is intrinsically different from a set of weakly connected power systems, where energy flows among different systems are marginal.
The materialisation of ECEI presents clear advantages, but also brings about vulnerabilities which may threaten its serviceability. The fact that these shortcomings exceed the providence of individual parties means that there is a need for new, effective instruments for managing risks.
The following picture outlines this evolution: national Electricity Power Systems (EPS) being embedded into ECEI (see Figure 1 ). This paper outlines the implications of this development, and studies the positive and negative effects of the extensive interconnectedness and digitalisation (i.e., the ubiquitous application of information and communication technologies). 
Trends and driving forces
The liberalisation of the European electricity sector has replaced centralised control by regional monopolies with a complex decentralised market structure, in which each of many different agents control a part of a technically highly integrated ECEI infrastructure. The distribution of the many functions in the electricity supply industry among numerous different actors and the actors' coordination through national market mechanisms and grid codes have greatly increased the management complexity of the sector.
This de facto decentralised control can work appropriately in the long term only if all the different agents in the system experience the correct incentives and comply with compatible rules all throughout the European infrastructure. Technical reliability, which used to be the goal for gauging the electric power systems' performance, is not enough for the ECEI reality. Many other factors, including environmental compatibility, market practicality and national security, have to be included in the decision-making process. These factors can be structured in five ranked layers (where the upper one comprises the lower ones): security, sustainability, economic efficiency, reliability, technical performance. Security can be used as the overarching concept, encompassing all the other objectives.
With respect to this notion of security, all stakeholders need to have a common understanding of the overall system goals and be willing to work towards them, during normal operation and in case of contingencies. If not, the pursuit of their own private ends, although legitimate, may enter into conflict with public objectives such as availability and affordability. Whereas the regional monopolies of the past required only a relatively simple regulation of their performance and tariffs, the complex decentralised system that is the result of liberalisation requires careful crafting of its institutional structure to ensure that the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, public goals are met. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the organisational changes that liberalisation brought about. Figure 2 shows, schematically, the structure of a regional monopoly: nearly all functions are performed by the same agent, the electricity utility company. Often, distribution and end-user supply were managed by separate companies, but these were again regional monopolies. Figure 3 shows a simple model of a liberalised electricity system. The figure shows the different groups of actors who together control the physical system. In Europe, many of these electricity systems are interconnected with each other. The operation is coordinated in several regional blocks (UCTE, Nordel, UK), whose composition leads to ECEI. A second trend, which already existed prior to liberalisation but was further stimulated by it, is the internationalisation (i.e., interconnection among national grids) of the electricity system. The operation of the vast European power network is complicated by the many different jurisdictions that exist. At a technical level, the transmission system operators cooperate with each other. At the economic level, large differences continue to exist between the markets in different countries. In order to create an international-level playing field, the economic conditions, such as transmission tariffs and network access rules in the different countries, should be put into synergy. In practice, however, different countries liberalise at different speeds and implement different models, not always considering the global consequences of local measures. In addition, it should be considered that there are changes in, for instance, environmental standards, taxes and subsidies. The complexity that results from the combination of the liberalisation and the internationalisation of the ECEI poses a threat to the reliability of electricity services. A clear case is given by the difficulties in the coordination of the responses to wide-area spread contingencies. The multitude of industrial actors and the many countries involved also complicate the achievement of a balanced development of the system in the long term, which in turn may give rise to more contingencies. A third trend, which we will call evolutionary unsuitability, is caused by the fact that electricity transmission networks increasingly are being used in ways for which they were not initially designed. Electricity systems are not just operated under high-stress conditions, but also beyond the limits of their original design. The increasing development of wind power is already leading to stability problems in certain areas. The changes in the electric output of wind parks lead to fast and significant changes in the way the electricity network is used. The network was not designed for such rapid operational changes. Distributed generation, which means the generation of electricity (and often also heat) in small units close to consumers, may also change the way the networks are used. Whereas large-scale wind energy mainly impacts the transmission networks, distributed generation would change the nature of distribution networks. This trend is unavoidable in an ECEI scenario. It is impossible to foresee the many uses that the infrastructure will be subject to. This will require a new approach to the engineering, deployment and operation of the infrastructure, which includes several non-engineering aspects. It is a 'Science and Art' issue that requires continuous collective learning in the production and management of complex systems.
A fourth significant trend is the wide-scale application of information and communication technologies in electricity systems, from the level of individual switches up to the operational control of entire electricity networks, and from customer databases to automated spot markets. While the use of information and communication technologies provides many opportunities, the large increase in connected devices and information flows also increases the vulnerability of the ECEI to failures of the information infrastructure and to deliberate harm through the use of it. Therefore there is a double effect: on the one hand there is an increase in functional capabilities due to the availability of information, but on the other there is an exposure of the system to cyber threats. All stakeholders have access, in one way or another, to the information components of the infrastructure -but at the same time it is more difficult to prevent access to illegitimate intruders.
Importance of Risk Awareness and Crisis Managementthe Italian Blackout Sequence of Events (September 28, 2003)
• 3:00 Italy imports 6.9 GW, 25% of the country's total load, 300 MW more than scheduled The ECEI is connatural to this E+I paradigm; it is immersed into a reality where all electricity functions (i.e., production, trading, transmission, distribution, billing, customer interaction) are dependent on information. Electricity (the physical dimension of the infrastructural services) coexists with data (the digital dimension of the same infrastructural services). The first dimension is composed of tangible assets: generators, transmission lines, transformers, control and protection equipment, etc. Tangibles are the traditional object for the valuation of the power business. The second dimension corresponds to intangibles: knowledge, transaction relationships, customer information, contracts, consumption profiles, security culture, etc. The perceived value of intangibles is overtaking that of tangibles. This happens in a continuous process that transforms the electric power infrastructure, driving to the formation and establishment of the E+I paradigm. When assessing security, this E+I reality cannot be ignored. This affects which vulnerabilities and threats have to be taken into consideration and which measures can be taken for solving the problems, and also how the governance of risk can be implemented. The wealth of information and the easy access to data sources have to be factored in when designing the risk governance process. 2 
Threats and vulnerabilities
The transformation of the electric power infrastructure driven by those trends indubitably bears favourable effects (e.g., diminishing prices for consumers, more competitive markets inducing innovative behaviours, more alternative sources of electric power supply), but it might also generate negative conditions for the overall security of the infrastructure.
These situations prone to risk are related to many facets of the infrastructure, such as the organisation of the power market, the regulation of the interconnections to the power grid, its topology and the technological solutions applied. In addition, it is necessary to consider the perception and reaction of society to those risks.
The liberalisation of power markets has fragmented investment decisions (mainly on the generation side) of many industrial players. The relatively long time required for developing new installations raises uncertainties over whether the combination of individual decisions will guarantee the security and adequacy of the infrastructure.
This situation can be complicated by the dependence of investments on environmental considerations and fuel prices and availability. A key fact is that the growth of transmission capacity, and in some places of generation, falls too far behind the growth in consumption. The main restriction on new power lines and generation plants is the difficulty of obtaining the necessary permits, mainly related to environmental considerations. The fuel aspects are obviously determined by geopolitical circumstances. Markets entail the danger that all new power plants make use of the same cheapest available fuel. The transition to liberalised markets has brought additional uncertainties provoked by changes in the regulatory frameworks.
The central question is whether competitive markets, even in a stable phase after liberalisation, provide adequate and timely investment incentives. The new regulation of power systems in Europe has a strong focus on costs. Nevertheless, it is not clear if the reduction of costs can be balanced with the need to maintain security and expand the power grid in a timely and economically efficient manner.
A key point is that different European countries have liberalised at different speeds and implemented different market models. This creates the significant risk of market distortions, which is further aggravated by the complexity of the institutional design.
Electricity generation has observed the development of power based on renewables. These are placed where the resources are available, not where the consumption exists. As a result, power transmission networks and international interconnectors are used in ways for which they were not designed, and their control and protection systems are put under stress.
These changes in power markets and in power generation and transmission are accompanied by a pervasive use of information and communication technologies. This has beneficial effects for the operation of power systems, and the integration of the industrial and business information systems within and between companies. But it has opened up opportunities for new types of system failures, both of accidental and malicious origin.
First of all, information security was never a point for industrial systems, and therefore there is a lack of proper security-related standards and of specific security technologies. Only in the very last years, with the awareness that interconnected information systems were open to electronic attacks, have standardisation bodies (e.g., IEC, IEEE, NERC) begun to work on appropriate security norms. However, technologies change rapidly and the application of standards necessitates time. This opens a window of opportunity for this kind of risk.
Figure 4 Threat landscape for ECEI
The power grid is exposed to accidental failures and natural hazards similar to the ones endured in the past. The question is whether the new structure with multiple operators is as resilient as the more centralised one in the past. The complexity of the European power network topology creates the possibility of failures that escalate from local problems to broad disturbances, and that propagate throughout the system, potentially leading to cascading blackouts across international borders. This requires well-orchestrated protection, but also the coordination of restoring services in case of widespread contingencies. As a matter of fact, many of the existing control and protection strategies and contingency defence plans are outdated. They were developed in a time when international flows were smaller, generation was dispatched by the system operator and the use of information and communication technology was much more limited. Much attention is currently given to the risk of terrorist attacks. The likelihood is difficult to estimate, but it would require a sophisticated, well-coordinated attack to bring a large part of the European power system down. Failure of individual power plants or power lines is a contingency that the system is designed to withstand, but a complete assessment, considering the interdependencies with other infrastructures, has not been performed yet.
The need for risk governance
The European electric power industry has been evolving rapidly in the last decade. The Electricity Directive 96/92/EC, adopted in 1996, sets common rules for the EU internal electricity market. It established the basis for the opening of the national markets, for the unbundling of the vertically integrated electricity companies, and in general for the organisation of the generation, transmission and distribution business.
As a means for establishing communication between the stakeholders, electric power systems and the policy decision-makers, a forum was convoked to discuss the regulatory process and the formation of the European internal electricity market. It was set up and organised by the European Commission and the first meeting was held in 1988. It is normally known as the Florence Forum. Its objective is to provide a neutral and informal framework for discussions concerning the implementation of the Electricity Directives.
The normative context was completed in 2003 with the new Electricity Directive n. 54, 3 complemented by Regulation 1228 on cross-border trade. 4 This Directive aims at establishing, by July 2007 at the latest, an open European market for electricity, where consumers will be free to shop around across borders. At the same time, a set of regulators have been instituted in all countries for ensuring the correct operation of the market and the regularity of the public service nature of the electricity supply.
The fundamental issue of this policy initiative has been the institution of the European internal market for electricity, and it is possible to say that up to now it has been successful and beneficial for the European citizen. Nevertheless, risk (and security in the broad sense employed in this paper) has not been considered as a main concern. Security of supply is mentioned as one of the public service attributes to be guaranteed. 5 Specifically, it is said that the goal is to achieve a "competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable market in electricity" (Art. 3). Some issues mentioned in the Directive are market mechanisms for ensuring sufficient electricity generation, long-term planning and the need to monitor the balance between supply and demand, topics left to the responsibility of each country. But no provision has been made for coping with the systemic risks that affect the European infrastructure as a whole.
Therefore, it is possible to ascertain a mismatch between the policy goal of developing a secure market, and the lack of dedicated mechanisms for dealing with risks that might rise above the control of a single power company and a single country.
Would current instruments be effective for dealing with systemic risks affecting the infrastructure? The only group that sees together all stakeholders (industry, regulators, policy decision-makers, consumers) is the Florence Forum. Could it be used for taking care of the infrastructure risks? The answer is negative, considering its current structure and working style. It is not a decision-oriented organisation; it is oriented to informal debates.
On the other hand, traditional methods of risk management (applied for instance by electric power companies) do not suffice for coping with the new challenges faced by the electricity infrastructure in its entirety. This paper analyses these changes and proposes a new way for society 6 to handle them: risk governance. While the regional monopolies of the past were well equipped to handle most challenges to the system, individually or in cooperation with each other, the scale and geographical scope of the potential security risks requires decision-making at many different levels: by international bodies such as the EU and associations of transmission system operators, at the national level by governments and regulators, at the company level by generation companies, network companies, system operators, etc., and finally perhaps also by end users themselves. As both the causes of the risks and the possible strategies for handling them often involve many different parties, this paper proposes an approach of risk governance to arrive at joint solutions amongst all the involved stakeholders, in addition to the management of risks by individual parties.
The need for a new approach is partly due to the nature of the new risks, which range from terrorism and cyber attacks to international cascading blackouts, and partly due to the transformation of the national electricity systems into a continental infrastructure. In addition, the changing nature of the European electricity markets creates new vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Liberalisation has distributed the control over the system among many more parties than used to be the case before liberalisation, whereas the response to a contingency requires fast, coordinated actions. The increasing internationalisation of the sector poses an additional challenge to contingency management across borders. In the near future, the European electricity infrastructure will be interconnected with North Africa, the Middle East, the whole Balkans, and ample regions of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and from the Artic Circle to the Maghreb). Not the least, the ubiquitous application of information and communication technologies in every part of the sector creates many new opportunities but also incorporates new vulnerabilities.
Past methods of managing risk in the electricity industry are no longer adequate in the realities of the current ECEI scenario. This is partly owing to the emergence of new risks, but also to the restructuring of the electricity industry. In the past, utility companies with a regional monopoly could be held responsible for virtually every aspect of the delivery of electricity. Electric utilities managed technical risks as well as environmental and health risks. It was common practice to apply cost-benefit analysis in order to fulfil primarily the shareholders' concerns. This can have trans-European impacts.
The current decentralised nature of liberalised electricity systems has the consequence that individual actors cannot be held responsible for the way the system as a whole functions. This means that, more than in the past, issues such as reliability and resilience need to be addressed at the level of the whole system. This requires a new approach, which is risk governance, in addition to the risk management actions, which needed and still need to be performed by the individual power companies. Risk governance admits the existence of multiple stakeholders, with their individual interests and viewpoints, in parallel with overall objectives (related to society as a whole). The decision-making process in general, and specifically that related to risks, has to take into consideration all these aspects. The diversity of objectives and actors has to be structured as a multi-criteria problem.
In a liberalised system, all these parties need to work together, as well as with parties who do not directly influence the physical system, such as traders, brokers, power exchangers and retail companies. Through the risk governance process, the different affected actors (should) cooperate to handle risks that exceed the boundaries of their own risk management processes. Risks that are (or should be) the subject of the risk governance process are either risks that involve multiple actors or risks that originate outside the control of the involved actors.
Which issues should be dealt with through the risk governance process and which ones through the risk management process? If the solution is within the risk management loop, there is no need for governance of the issue. However, if the solution is beyond the powers of the actor that is affected, there is a need for risk governance.
Lessons learned and policy recommendations
Some main lessons are portrayed:
• The European society is witnessing the advent of ECEI, a new kind of human construct of great technical and organisational complexity, which cannot be managed by a single entity. It is subject to risks that are critical for society. Those risks are of very varied natures, and have to be counteracted with the proper approach.
• The ECEI is evolving into an 'Electricity plus Information' (E+I) infrastructure. The operation of the power systems, the functioning of the markets, the links between industry, regulators and users -all are information-based. The efficiency of the system, the management of the security, the adequacy, the market: all are E+I matters. The electric service is now an E+I compound product.
• The new risk landscape faced by ECEI can be decomposed into three layers:
Risk governance
• ECEI's emerging risks of European-wide relevance have to be governed by means of a decision-making process tailored to its specific needs and requirements. Key features to be considered are the multiplicity of stakeholders, the emergent security attributes of the infrastructure and the dynamic nature of the system.
• In order to be successful, risk governance needs to take into account all risk factors and all threats that cannot be dealt with adequately by individual actors' risk management processes. Risk governance has to deal with them in a comprehensive and systematic way, e.g., bearing in mind, among others, power system dynamics, market inventives, information and communication technologies, potential malicious attacks.
• Risk governance implies the involvement of all stakeholders, and clear rules for the deliberation and development of decisions. In Europe, owing to the international nature of the problem, this situation will require the participation of national authorities, all business associated with the electric power infrastructure, international organisations, the European Union, and not least, the end users.
• Risk governance is a new discipline, and more research is urgently needed to develop it. However, this should not discourage the application of current solutions to such pressing problems as those presented by ECEI, because other alternatives are clearly less adequate.
• Risk governance needs to be supported by the proper tools. Governance presupposes the participation of a multitude of actors, from a variety of standpoints (political, jurisdictional, technical, environmental, economic, etc.). The deployment of a risk governance process for the electric power infrastructure will require the utilisation of advanced instruments (most likely based on digital platforms).
The implementation of a risk governance process leads to two possible alternatives:
1 The modification of mission statements for the current organisations in Europe (such as the Florence Forum)
2 The institution of a European Council for the Security of Electric Power (ECSEP).
ECSEP will have the power to monitor and enforce compliance, and also to verify that the different organisations possess the appropriate capabilities. Compliance can be guaranteed by a set of different mechanisms: peer pressure, penalties, economic incentives, etc. The verification of capabilities can be linked to certification, auditing and other qualification procedures. Owing to the foreseen increasing international interconnections of ECEI with Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, ECSEP and its members will have to foster the adoption of its recommendations and standards in those regions. ECSEP will have to be granted regulatory powers by all countries falling under its regime and as appropriated by the European Union. The management of ECSEP as an independent authority must be guaranteed by a checks-and-control balance between an independent executive board (responsible for the planning and execution of ECSEP activities) and a stakeholders' group (responsible for nominating the board members, setting the strategic objectives, and approving the financial statements). 
